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The problem of constrained judgment
aggregation
Franz Dietrich and Christian List
06/2009
Group decisions must often obey exogenous constraints. While in a preference ag-
gregation problem constraints are modelled by restricting the set of feasible alterna-
tives, this paper addresses the modelling of constraints when aggregating individual
yes/no judgments on interconnected propositions. For example, court judgments in
breach-of-contract cases should respect the constraint that action and obligation are
necessary and sufficient for liability, and judgments on budget items should respect
budgetary constraints. In this paper, we make constraints in judgment aggregation
explicit by relativizing the rationality conditions of consistency and deductive closure
to a constraint set, whose variation yields more or less strong notions of rationality.
This approach of explicit constraints contrasts with that of building constraints as
axioms into the logic, which turns compliance with constraints into a matter of logical
consistency and thereby conflates requirements of ordinary logical consistency (such
as not to affirm a proposition and also its negation) and requirements dictated by
the environment (such as budget constraints). We present some general impossibility
results on constrained judgment aggregation; they are immediate corollaries of known
results on (unconstrained) judgment aggregation.
1 Introduction
The theory of judgment aggregation asks by which aggregation procedure a
group of individuals can or should arrive at collective acceptance/rejection judg-
ments on a given set of interconnected propositions (e.g., List and Pettit 2002,
Pauly and van Hees 2006, Dietrich 2006, Nehring and Puppe 2008). A classic
illustration is given by the ‘doctrinal paradox’ (Kornhauser and Sager 1986).
Suppose a three-member court has to make collective judgments on three con-
nected propositions:
a: The defendant did action X.
b: The defendant had a contractual obligation not to do action X.
c: The defendant is liable for breach of contract.
Suppose further that legal doctrine imposes the constraint that action and
obligation (the two premises) are necessary and sufficient for liability (the con-
clusion), in short c↔ (a∧ b). It can then happen that the majority judgments
on the two premises (a and b) conflict with the majority judgment on the con-
clusion (c), relative to that constraint. Suppose, for example, the first judge
holds both a and b to be true; the second holds a but not b to be true; and
the third holds b but not a to be true. If each judge individually respects the
a b c
Individual 1 True True True
Individual 2 True False False
Individual 3 False True False
Majority True True False
Table 1: The doctrinal paradox
constraint that c↔ (a∧ b), then the majority judgments — in support of a and
b and against c — violate the given constraint, as shown in Table 1.
The conflict may disappear if we modify the constraint. For example, the
majority judgments {a, b,¬c} pose no problem if a and b are considered neces-
sary but not sufficient for liability (so that the constraint is c→ (a∧ b) instead
of c ↔ (a ∧ b)), or if we introduce a third premise d (so that the constraint is
c↔ (a ∧ b ∧ d)), or if we drop the constraint altogether.
Our aim in this paper is to investigate judgment aggregation on general
agendas of propositions with general sets of constraints. This framework is
suitable for modelling not only the court example but also many other judgment
aggregation problems. Judgments on budget items, for example, are required
to respect budgetary constraints. If propositions a, b and c state, respectively,
that spending on education, healthcare and defense should be increased, then a
budgetary constraint could stipulate that not all three can be accepted together,
formally ¬(a ∧ b ∧ c). Judgments on binary ranking propositions such as ‘x is
preferable to y’, ‘y is preferable to z’ and ‘x is preferable to z’ are connected by
constraints such as transitivity or acyclicity. Judgments of biologists on whether
two organisms fall into the same species are constrained by the assumption that
belonging to the same species is an equivalence relation.
We explain how constraints between propositions can be naturally incorpo-
rated into the judgment aggregation model. Constraints have of course played
a role in earlier work, particularly in the computer science literature under the
label ‘integrity constraints’ (e.g., Konieczny and Pino-Perez 2002). See also the
notion of ‘context’ in Nehring and Puppe (2008) and that of the ‘axioms’ in
Dietrich (2007).
We present two general impossibility theorems that depend on the nature
of those constraints. The results are corollaries of results in Dietrich and List
(2007a), but have a somewhat different interpretational flavour. They are also
closely related to results by Dokow and Holzman (forthcoming) and prior results
by Nehring and Puppe (2002).
To illustrate our approach, we apply our two theorems to the aggregation
of judgments on binary relations (which can represent various forms of compar-
isons), distinguishing between different constraint sets on such binary relations.
In particular, we consider strict orderings, acyclic binary relations and equiv-
alence relations. This application generalizes earlier results by List and Pettit
(2001/2004), Dietrich (2007), Dietrich and List (2007a) and Nehring and Puppe
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(2008) on the representation of preference aggregation in the judgment aggre-
gation model (a related result drawing on the ‘property space’ framework is
Nehring 2003). A comprehensive bibliography on judgment aggregation can be
found online (List 2004-7).
This paper draws extensively on our prior work Dietrich and List (2008a).
2 The model
We consider a group of individuals N = {1, 2, . . . , n} (n ≥ 2). The propositions
on which judgments are made are represented in logic (following List and Pettit
2002, 2004; we use Dietrich’s 2007 generalized model).
2.1 Logic
A logic is an ordered pair (L, ⊢), where (i) L is a non-empty set of sentences,
called propositions, closed under negation (i.e., if p ∈ L then ¬p ∈ L, where ¬
denotes ‘not’), and (ii) ⊢ is an entailment relation, where, for each set S ⊆ L
and each proposition p ∈ L, S ⊢ p is read as ‘S entails p’ (we write p ⊢ q to
abbreviate {p} ⊢ q).1 A set S ⊆ L is inconsistent if S ⊢ p and S ⊢ ¬p for some
p ∈ L, and consistent otherwise. We require the logic to satisfy the following
minimal conditions:2
(L1) For all p ∈ L, p ⊢ p (self-entailment).
(L2) For all p ∈ L and S ⊆ T ⊆ L, if S ⊢ p then T ⊢ p (monotonicity).
(L3) ∅ is consistent, and each consistent set S ⊆ L has a consistent superset
T ⊆ L containing a member of each pair p,¬p ∈ L (completability).
In standard propositional logic, L contains propositions such as a, b, a ∧ b,
a ∨ b, ¬(a→ b) (where ∧, ∨, → denote ‘and’, ‘or’, ‘if-then’, respectively). The
set {a, a → b} entails proposition b, for example, whereas the set {a ∨ b} does
not entail a. Examples of consistent sets are {a, a→ b, b} and {a∧b}, examples
of inconsistent ones {a,¬a} and {a, a→ b,¬b}.
2.2 Agenda
The agenda is the set of propositions on which judgments are made, defined
as a non-empty subset X ⊆ L expressible as X = {p,¬p : p ∈ X+} for a
1Formally, ⊢⊆ P(L)× L, where P(L) is the power set of L.
2Alternatively we may assume three conditions on the consistency notion (jointly equiv-
alent to L1-L3): (C1) All sets {p,¬p} ⊆ L are inconsistent; (C2) subsets of consistent sets
S ⊆ L are consistent; (C3) L3 holds. In many (non-paraconsistent) logics, the notion of entail-
ment is uniquely determined by that of consistency (via A ⊢ p⇔ [A ∪ {¬p} is inconsistent]),
so that the two notions are interdefinable. If we restrict attention to logics with interdefin-
ability, or if we are ultimately interested only in whether judgments are consistent (not in
whether they are deductively closed), we can use the system of consistent sets rather than
the relation ⊢ as the primitive logical notion (and assume C1-C3). For details see Dietrich
(2007).
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set X+ ⊆ L of unnegated propositions. Notationally, we assume that double
negations cancel each other out (i.e., ¬¬p stands for p).3 In the three-member
court example, X = {a,¬a, b,¬b, c,¬c}.
2.3 Constraints
A constraint set is a consistent subset C ⊆ L. It is meant to represent logical
interconnections that are stipulated to hold between propositions. In the three-
member court example, C = {c↔ (a ∧ b)}. We say that a set S ⊆ L entails a
proposition p ∈ L relative to C, formally S ⊢C p, if S∪C ⊢ p. We say that a set
S ⊆ L is consistent relative to C if S∪C is consistent, and inconsistent relative
to C otherwise. Hereafter we refer to C-entailment and C-(in)consistency. The
relationship between C-(in)consistency and C-entailment is analogous to that
between (in)consistency and entailment simpliciter, which can be seen as the
special cases of C-(in)consistency and C-entailment for C = ∅. A set S ⊆ L
is minimally C-inconsistent if S is C-inconsistent but every proper subset of S
is C-consistent. A proposition p ∈ L is C-contingent if {p} and {¬p} are C-
consistent. Informally, a C-contingent proposition is one whose truth or falsity
is not settled by the constraints in C alone.
2.4 Individual judgment sets
Each individual i’s judgment set is the set Ai ⊆ X of propositions that he or
she accepts. On a belief interpretation, Ai is the set of propositions believed
by individual i to be true; on a desire interpretation, the set of propositions
desired by individual i to be true. A judgment set Ai is
• C-consistent if, as just defined, Ai ∪ C is consistent;
• C-deductively closed if it contains all propositions p ∈ X such thatAi∪C ⊢
p (i.e., Ai ⊢C p);
• complete if it contains a member of each proposition-negation pair p,¬p ∈
X.
A profile is an n-tuple (A1, . . . , An) of individual judgment sets.
2.5 Aggregation functions
An aggregation function is a function F that maps each profile (A1, . . . , An) from
some domain of admissible ones to a collective judgment set F (A1, . . . , An) =
A ⊆ X, the set of propositions that the group as a whole accepts. The judgment
3Strictly speaking, when we use the symbol ¬ hereafter, we mean a modified negation
symbol ∼, where ∼ p := ¬p if p is unnegated and ∼ p := q if p = ¬q for some q. This
convention is to ensure that p ∈ X implies ¬p ∈ X.
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set A can be interpreted as the set of propositions collectively believed to be
true or as the set collectively desired to be true. Below we impose minimal
conditions on aggregation functions (including on the domain of admissible
profiles and the co-domain of admissible collective judgment sets). Standard
examples of aggregation functions are
• majority voting, where F (A1, ..., An) is the set of propositions p ∈ X for
which the number of individuals with p ∈ Ai exceeds that with p /∈ Ai;
• dictatorships, where F (A1, ..., An) = Ai for some antecedently fixed indi-
vidual i ∈ N ; and
• inverse dictatorships, where F (A1, ..., An) = {¬p : p ∈ Ai} for some
antecedently fixed individual i ∈ N .
3 Why explicit constraints?
We could avoid explicit reference to constraints by building them into the logic.
Indeed, whenever the logic (L,⊢) satisfies L1, L2 and L3, then so does the logic
(L,⊢C) induced by the constraint set C. C-consistency in (L,⊢) translates into
standard consistency in (L,⊢C), and C-deductive closure in (L,⊢) translates
into standard deductive closure in (L,⊢C). This is in fact the only insight
needed to translate existing theorems into theorems with explicit constraints.
Why, then, should we use explicit constraints at all?
3.1 A first argument
First of all, constraints introduce a different perspective on the notion of con-
sistency. For a judgment set to be logically inconsistent is somewhat different
and perhaps more dramatically ‘irrational’ than to be merely C-inconsistent,
i.e., incompatible with the given constraints. If constraints are built into the
logic, the distinction between these two kinds of inconsistency disappears: all
inconsistencies are by definition logical ones.
3.2 A second argument
The nature of the appropriate set of constraints is often unclear or controversial.
For example, what are the correct budgetary constraints or legal constraints
when a government cabinet makes decisions? It may thus be interesting to vary
the constraint set C, so that we can express the fact that a judgment set is C-
consistent yet C ′-inconsistent (for distinct C,C ′ ⊆ L). If reaching C-consistent
collective judgments turns out to be unrealistic, the group might look for C ′-
consistent collective judgments for a ‘less ambitious’ constraint set C ′, say a
proper subset C ′  C. There is a long tradition in social choice theory of
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considering differently strong rationality constraints on preferences: one may or
may not require completeness, one may or may not require full transitivity etc.
As discussed later, each set of rationality conditions on preferences corresponds
to a particular constraint set.
3.3 A third argument
If it is unclear for some proposition p ∈ L whether or not it should constrain
the group decision, a natural move is to put it into the agenda X (rather
than into the constraint set C): i.e., to let the group decide whether or not p
should constrain the judgments on the (other) propositions in the agenda. For
instance, the ‘legal doctrine’ in the introductory court example or the condition
of a balanced budget might be made part of the agenda X rather than of the
constraint set C.
When a constraint becomes a proposition under decision, its correct logi-
cal representation becomes crucial. Let us illustrate this point using the two
examples just mentioned. First, consider the court example, and suppose the
‘legal doctrine’ (that action and obligation are necessary and sufficient for li-
ability) is not imposed on the judges but put up for decision. One might be
tempted to represent the legal doctrine as a material biconditional c↔ (a∧ b).
This, however, is a problematic representation. Consider the resulting agenda
X = {a,¬a, b,¬b, c,¬c, c↔ (a ∧ b),¬(c↔ (a ∧ b))}. When a judge rejects the
legal doctrine, what he or she rejects is in fact not the material biimplication
c ↔ (a ∧ b); indeed, he or she may well believe that a, b and c are all true
or all false (so that c ↔ (a ∧ b) holds). Rather the judge rejects the binding
nature of a and b for c. One might say, the judge rejects a subjunctive bicon-
ditional between c and a ∧ b, or perhaps that he or she rejects the proposition
(c↔ (a ∧ b)), where  is a modal necessity operator (‘necessarily, i.e., in all
possible worlds, it is the case that...’). If the legal doctrine is represented using
a subjunctive biconditional or modal necessity operator, negating the resulting
proposition becomes logically consistent with assigning arbitrary truth values
to a, b and c, so that the previous problem is avoided.
Similarly, suppose a government faces a decision problem, and suppose a
balanced budget is not imposed as a constraint but represented by a proposition
p in the government’s agenda X. One might be tempted to specify p as the
disjunction ∨q∈Sq, where each proposition q ∈ S describes a way in which
the budget can be balanced (such as ‘low spending on education and average
spending on social security and...’). The problem here is similar to that just
identified in the court example. An individual who rejects the requirement that
the budget must be balanced may still hold other beliefs that entail a balanced
budget (i.e., that entail ∨q∈Sq): he or she may see no necessity of a balanced
budget yet favour low total spending for other reasons. A more appropriate
representation of the balanced budget requirement might be to let p be the
proposition O(∨q∈Sq), where O is a deontic ‘ought’ operator (‘it is required
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that...’). SinceO(∨q∈Sq) states that the budget ought to be balanced, it becomes
consistent (in standard deontic logic) to negate O(∨q∈Sq) while asserting ∨q∈Sq,
which removes the problem that arises when p is defined as ∨q∈Sq.
However, if a constraint is not part of the agenda but part of the constraint
set C, its misrepresentation is less problematic. The reason is that propositions
in C cannot be negated, and often the logical interconnections induced by the
(non-negated) constraints in the form of C-consistency and C-deductive closure
do not change if these constraints are misspecified in the sense just illustrated.
In the court example, for instance, the material biimplication c↔ (a∧b) imposes
exactly the same constraints on a, b and c as a subjunctive one, and also as
the proposition (c ↔ (a ∧ b)), namely that a, b, c can only have truth values
(T, T, T ) or (F, F, F ) or (T, F, F ) or (F, T, F ). For this reason, when giving
concrete examples of constraint sets in this paper we usually omit modal or
deontic necessity operators and do not address the nature of (bi)conditionals.
For instance, when we later consider the transitivity constraint on preferences,
we model it as the statement that ‘preferences are transitive’, not the statement
that ‘preferences are necessarily transitive’ (and similarly for other constraints
on preferences).4
4 Impossibilities of aggregation under constraints
Can we find attractive aggregation functions? The answer to this question de-
pends on two things. First, it depends on what conditions we impose on the
aggregation function. If, for example, we do not seek to achieve C-consistency
at the collective level (for an appropriate C), majority voting may be a per-
fectly fine solution. Likewise, in the absence of any democratic requirements,
a dictatorship of one individual arises as a possibility, which generates C-
consistent and complete judgment sets. If the only democratic requirement
is non-dictatorship and we allow collective judgments to be incomplete but re-
tain their C-consistency and C-deductive closure, then oligarchies arise as a
solution; here, any proposition is accepted if and only if all members of a fixed
set M ⊆ N of ‘oligarchs’ accept it.5
Second, the question of whether we can find attractive aggregation functions
depends on how the propositions in the agenda are logically connected, which
in turn depends on the constraint set C. More constraints can often make
4On subjunctive implications in judgment aggregation, see Dietrich (forthcoming); on
modal operators for representing legal prescriptions, see List (2006) and Dietrich (2007).
5More precisely, an oligarchy F is defined by F (A1, .., An) = ∩i∈MAi for all profiles
(A1, ..., An) in the universal C-domain (as defined below), whereM ⊆ N is a fixed non-empty
set of ‘oligarchs’. Oligarchies generate C-consistent and C-deductively closed (but usually in-
complete) collective judgment sets, as the intersection of C-consistent and C-deductively
closed sets is C-consistent and C-deductively closed. To avoid dictatorship, there must be at
least two oligarchs; if all individuals are oligarchs, F is unanimity rule, an anonymous rule
with considerable collective incompleteness.
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aggregation problems harder to solve. If the court in the original example did
not have to respect the constraint that action and obligation are necessary and
sufficient for liability (c↔ (a∧ b)), then the majority judgments resulting from
the individual judgments in Table 1 would not be considered inconsistent.
Let us address these questions in general terms. Consider some given agenda
X and constraint set C. The theorems to be presented here are C-relativized
versions of existing theorems from Dietrich and List (2007a). We choose to focus
on theorems that require complete and C-consistent (hence also C-deductively
closed) collective judgment sets. But one could equally obtain theorems that
require merely C-consistent and C-deductively closed (possibly incomplete) col-
lective judgment sets (by adapting results by Dietrich and List 2008b and Dokow
and Holzman 2006), or theorems that require just C-consistent collective judg-
ment sets (by adapting recent results by Dietrich and List 2007b).
4.1 An impossibility of systematic aggregation
In this subsection, we require the aggregation function to satisfy the following
conditions:
Universal C-domain. The domain of F is the set of all possible profiles of
C-consistent and complete individual judgment sets on the agenda X.
Collective C-rationality. F generates C-consistent and complete collective
judgment sets on the agenda X.
Systematicity. For any propositions p, q ∈ X and profiles (A1, . . . , An),
(A∗1, . . . , A
∗
n) ∈ Domain(F ), if [for all individuals i, p ∈ Ai if and only if
q ∈ A∗i ] then [p ∈ F (A1, . . . , An) if and only if q ∈ F (A
∗
1, . . . , A
∗
n)].
Universal C-domain requires that the aggregation function accept as admis-
sible any possible profile of fully rational individual judgment sets respecting the
constraints in the set C. Collective C-rationality requires that the aggregation
function produce as output a fully rational collective judgment set respecting
the same constraints. Systematicity requires, first, that the collective judgment
on each proposition depend only on individual judgments on that proposition,
and, second, that the pattern of dependence be the same for all propositions.
The first part of the condition requires the aggregation to be propositionwise
(as captured by the independence condition defined later), and the second part
adds a neutrality requirement.
Call agenda X minimally C-connected if it satisfies the following conditions:
(i) X has a minimal C-inconsistent subset Y with |Y | ≥ 3, and
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(ii) X has a minimal C-inconsistent subset Y such that (Y \Z)∪{¬z : z ∈ Z}
is C-consistent for some subset Z ⊆ Y of even size.6
It is easy to see that the agenda X = {a,¬a, b,¬b, c,¬c} in the three-
member court example with constraint set C = {c↔ (a∧ b)} satisfies minimal
C-connectedness. On the other hand, if C were the empty set, the agenda
X = {a,¬a, b,¬b, c,¬c} would not be minimally C-connected: it would violate
both (i) and (ii). Thus the question of whether or not an agenda is minimally
C-connected depends crucially on the strength of the constraint set C.
The following is a corollary of Dietrich and List’s (2007) Theorem 1 (which
in turn generalizes earlier results on systematicity by List and Pettit 2002 and
Pauly and van Hees 2006):
Theorem 1. For a minimally C-connected agenda X, every aggregation func-
tion F satisfying universal C-domain, collective C-rationality and systematicity
is a (possibly inverse) dictatorship.
The agenda condition of Theorem 1 (minimal C-connectedness) is tight if
the agenda is finite or the logic is compact (and n ≥ 3 and X contains at least
one C-contingent proposition), i.e., minimal C-connectedness is also necessary,
and not merely sufficient, for characterizing (possibly inverse) dictatorships by
the conditions of Theorem 1.7 The same holds for the agenda conditions of the
other theorems stated below.
There are two ways in which Theorem 1 can be turned into a characterization
of dictatorships as opposed to possibly inverse ones. One way is to impose an
additional unanimity condition on the aggregation function:
Unanimity. For any unanimous profile (A, . . . , A) ∈ Domain(F ),
F (A, . . . , A) = A.
Theorem 1a. For a minimally C-connected agenda X, every aggregation
function F satisfying universal C-domain, collective C-rationality, systematicity
and unanimity is a dictatorship.
The other way to obtain a characterization of dictatorships from Theorem
1 is to impose an additional asymmetry condition on the agenda. Call agenda
6This clause is for finite X equivalent to a C-relativized version of Dokow and Holzman’s
(forthcoming) non-affineness condition: the set of admissible yes/no views on the propositions
in X (corresponding to C-consistent and complete judgment sets on X) is a non-affine subset
of {0, 1}X .
7If X is not minimally C-connected, there exists an aggregation function that satisfies
universal C-domain, collective C-rationality and systematicity and is not a (possibly inverse)
dictatorship. Let M be a subset of {1, ..., n} of odd size at least 3. If part (i) of minimal
C-connectedness is violated, then majority voting among the individuals in M satisfies all
requirements. If part (ii) is violated, the aggregation rule F with universal C-domain defined
by F (A1, ..., An) := {p ∈ X : the number of individuals i ∈ M with p ∈ Ai is odd} satisfies
all requirements. The second example is based on Dokow and Holzman (2005).
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X C-asymmetric if there exists a C-inconsistent subset Y ⊆ X such that {¬y :
y ∈ Y } is C-consistent.
Theorem 1b. For a minimally C-connected and C-asymmetric agenda
X, every aggregation function F satisfying universal C-domain, collective C-
rationality and systematicity is a dictatorship.
4.2 An impossibility of general propositionwise aggrega-
tion
The above condition of systematicity is a strong condition on an aggregation
function, which goes well beyond the requirement of propositionwise aggre-
gation by adding the (neutrality-type) requirement of equal treatment of all
propositions. We now ask whether we can obtain a characterization of dictator-
ships using the weaker condition of propositionwise aggregation, the so-called
independence condition, which drops the neutrality part of the systematicity
condition.
Independence. For any proposition p ∈ X and profiles (A1, . . . , An), (A∗1, . . . ,
A∗n) ∈ Domain(F ), if [for all individuals i, p ∈ Ai if and only if p ∈ A
∗
i ] then
[p ∈ F (A1, . . . , An) if and only if p ∈ F (A
∗
1, . . . , A
∗
n)].
Let us define the agenda condition of C-path-connectedness, building upon
Nehring and Puppe’s (2002) condition of total blockedness.8 For any p, q ∈ X,
we write p ⊢∗C q if {p,¬q} ∪ Y is C-inconsistent for some Y ⊆ X that is C-
consistent with p and with ¬q.9 Now an agenda X is C-path-connected if
(iii) for every C-contingent p, q ∈ X, there exist p1, p2, ..., pk ∈ X (with p = p1
and q = pk) such that p1 ⊢
∗
C p2, p2 ⊢
∗
C p3, ..., pk−1 ⊢
∗
C pk.
The agenda in the three-member court example above is minimally C-
connected but not C-path-connected, but as shown below, preference aggre-
gation problems can be represented by agendas that are both minimally C-
connected and C-path-connected. Call an agenda strongly C-connected if it is
C-path-connected and satisfies (ii). It then follows (for finite X or a compact
logic) that X also satisfies (i) and hence that it is minimally C-connected as
well.
Theorem 2. For a strongly C-connected agenda X, every aggregation
function F satisfying universal C-domain, collective C-rationality, independence
and unanimity is a dictatorship.
8The relationship between C-path-connectedness and total blockedness arises when C = ∅.
For a compact logic, ∅-path-connectedness is equivalent to total blockedness; generally, ∅-
path-connectedness is weaker than total blockedness.
9For non-paraconsistent logics (in the sense of L4 in Dietrich 2007), {p,¬q} ∪ Y is C-
inconsistent if and only if {p} ∪ Y ⊢C q.
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This result is the C-relativized version of a result proved independently
by Dietrich and List (2007) and Dokow and Holzman (forthcoming).10 Both
of these results extend a prior result by Nehring and Puppe (2002) with an
additional monotonicity condition on F .
Finally, all results in this section continue to hold under generalized defini-
tions of minimal and strong C-connectedness.11
5 An application: binary relations
To illustrate the results above, we apply them to the aggregation of binary
comparisons, such as betterness judgments or judgments of (a given type of)
equivalence. Such judgments are given by a binary relation over a set of objects
to be compared, e.g., policy alternatives, job candidates or organisms to be
classified into species. How can binary relations be represented in the judgment
aggregation model? We use the following construction, drawing on List and
Pettit (2001/2004), Dietrich (2007) and Dietrich and List (2007).
A simple predicate logic. We consider a predicate logic with constants
x, y, z, ... ∈ K (representing objects), variables v, w, v1, v2 , ... (ranging over
objects), identity symbol =, a binary relation symbol P (representing the com-
parative relation in question), logical connectives ¬ (not), ∧ (and), ∨ (or), →
(if-then), and universal quantifier ∀. Formally, L is the smallest set such that
• L contains all propositions of the forms αPβ and α = β, where α and
β are constants or variables, and
• whenever L contains two propositions p and q, then L also contains
¬p, (p ∧ q), (p ∨ q), (p→ q) and (∀v)p, where v is any variable.
We drop brackets when there is no ambiguity.
Constraint sets. We consider some alternative constraint sets. We begin
with the constraint set on fully rational strict preferences, the paradigmatic
binary relation in social choice theory:
Cfully rational =


(∀v1)(∀v2)(v1Pv2 → ¬v2Pv1)
(∀v1)(∀v2)(∀v3)((v1Pv2 ∧ v2Pv3)→ v1Pv3)
(∀v1)(∀v2)(¬ v1=v2 → (v1Pv2 ∨ v2Pv1))

 12.
10Dokow and Holzman restrict the agenda to be finite (with only contingent propositions)
and for this case show the tightness of the agenda assumptions (if n ≥ 3).
11In the definitions of minimal and strong C-connectedness, (i) and (ii) can be weakened,
namely to the C-relativised versions of the conditions (i*) and (ii*) given in Dietrich (2007).
All theorems presented survive the weakening, and the agenda assumptions of Theorems 1,
1a and 1b become tight even for infinite X in a non-compact logic (again provided that X
contains a contingent proposition and n ≥ 3). The weakened conditions become equivalent
to the original ones for finite X or a compact logic.
12For technical reasons, the constraint set also contains, for each pair of distinct constants
x, y, the condition ¬x=y.
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The three displayed propositions in Cfully rational are the constraints of asym-
metry, transitivity and connectedness. To represent weak preferences rather
than strict ones, Cfully rational needs to be redefined as the set of rationality con-
ditions on weak preferences (i.e., reflexivity, transitivity and connectedness); see
also Dietrich (2007).13
Contrast this with the constraint set on merely acyclic (but not necessarily
fully rational) strict preferences, representing a weaker notion of rationality:
Cacyclic =
{
¬(α1Pa2 ∧ ... ∧ αm−1Pam ∧ amPa1)
: a1, ...am ∈ K pairwise distinct, m ≥ 1
}
14.
The propositions in Cacyclic rule out any cycle of any length m ≥ 1. In
particular, irreflexivity is enforced (take m = 1). Transitivity, however, is
not required. Thus the set {xPy, yPz,¬xPz}, while inconsistent relative to
Cfully rational, is consistent relative to Cacyclic.
Next we consider the constraint set on equivalence relations, suitable for
classifying objects:
Cequivalence =


(∀v)(vPv)
(∀v1)(∀v2)(∀v3)((v1Pv2 ∧ v2Pv3)→ v1Pv3)
(∀v1)(∀v2)(v1Pv2 → v2Pv1))

 15.
The three displayed propositions in Cequivalence are the constraints of reflexiv-
ity, transitivity and symmetry. While this constraint set would obviously not be
imposed when P represents a preference relation (since ‘better than’ is neither
reflexive nor symmetric), it may be imposed on a relation of equal suitabil-
ity between job candidates (since ‘is as suitable as’ is plausibly an equivalence
relation) or on the relation of belonging to the same species among organisms.
Each of these constraint sets C induces its own notions of C-consistency and
C-deductive closure.
The agenda. The binary-relation agenda is the set X of all propositions of
the form xPy,¬xPy ∈ L, where x and y are constants. The question of which
agenda condition is met by the binary-relation agenda depends crucially on the
given constraint set. The following lemma holds:
Lemma 1. The binary-relation agenda X (with |K| ≥ 3) is
(a) strongly C-connected when C = Cfully rational;
13Transitivity and connectedness are as defined above. Reflexivity can be stated by the
proposition (∀v)(vPv). For aesthetic reasons, one might also replace the predicate symbol P
by R in the logic.
14Again, the constraint set also contains, for each pair of distinct constants x, y, the condi-
tion ¬x=y.
15Again, the constraint set also contains, for each pair of distinct constants x, y, the condi-
tion ¬x=y.
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(b) minimally, but not strongly, C-connected when C = Cacyclic;
(c) minimally, but not strongly, C-connected when C = Cequivalence.
In part (a), the C-path-connectedness part is a variant of a lemma by
Nehring (2003); for instance, xPy ⊢∗C xPz because {xPy, yPz} ⊢C xPz (where
x, y, z ∈ K are pairwise distinct). In parts (a) and (b), minimal C-connectedness
holds since any cycle Y = {xPy, yPz, zPx} ⊆ X defines a minimalC-inconsistent
set, which becomes C-consistent by negating two elements. In part (c), minimal
C-connectedness holds because any set of type Y = {xPy, yPz,¬xPz} ⊆ X
(with x, y, z pairwise distinct) is minimally C-inconsistent and becomes C-
consistent by negating any two members.
By this lemma, Theorems 1, 1a and 1b apply to the binary relation agenda
for any of the three constraint sets C. This allows the conclusion that it is
impossible to aggregate preference relations — whether fully rational or just
acyclic — or equivalence relations in a systematic and non-degenerate way, unless
we restrict the domain of individual inputs or allow some kind of collective
irrationality (such as incomplete collective judgment sets).
By part (a), the stronger impossibility of Theorem 2 applies when the con-
straint set is Cfully rational. It is impossible to aggregate fully rational preference
relations in an independent, unanimity preserving and non-dictatorial manner,
again unless we restrict the domain of individual inputs or allow collective irra-
tionality. The latter is precisely Arrow’s famous theorem on the aggregation of
preferences (in the case where indifference between distinct options is excluded).
In conclusion, the present approach allows us to derive a large number of
general results on aggregation problems with various constraints in a simple
unified framework. An interesting question for future research is how the results
are affected when different constraints are imposed at individual and collective
levels, for example, when the constraints on collective judgments are weaker
than those on individual ones or vice-versa.
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